Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
zbMATH Open document ID: 1395.91025
author: Toshiyuki Hirai
author: Naoki Watanabe
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2018-06-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6897185
zbMATH Keywords: Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
zbMATH Keywords: patent licensing game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2018.04.001
OpenAlex ID: W2802718198
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Wikidata QID: Q129968431
DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2018.04.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6897185