Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91142
author: Marcelo Caffera
author: Juan Dubra
author: Nicolás Figueroa
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2018-07-03T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: MPRA paper 75721.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6898096
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: preference
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2750711473
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.08.002
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6898096