Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91169
author: Wei Ding
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2018-07-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
zbMATH DE Number: 6904250
zbMATH Keywords: wage-bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: labor unions
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: signaling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00712-014-0401-9
OpenAlex ID: W1993033809
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DOI: 10.1007/S00712-014-0401-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6904250