On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91161
author: Haris Aziz
author: Florian Brandl
author: Felix Brandt
author: Markus Brill
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-07-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60E15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 6902127
zbMATH Keywords: strategyproofness
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic dominance
zbMATH Keywords: random serial dictatorship
zbMATH Keywords: maximal lotteries
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2018.03.005
OpenAlex ID: W2789598381
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Wikidata QID: Q130076020
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.03.005