Matching in the large: an experimental study
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Matching in the large: an experimental study
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91370
author: Y. Aharonov
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-07-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6902144
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: school choice
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
zbMATH Keywords: scale
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2018.04.004
OpenAlex ID: W3013045810
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Wikidata QID: Q129700661
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.04.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6902144