To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91103
author: Ned Augenblick
author: Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-07-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6902145
zbMATH Keywords: privacy
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic communication
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.10.014
OpenAlex ID: W2766031503
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.014
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6902145