Balanced externalities and the Shapley value
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Balanced externalities and the Shapley value
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91028
author: Ben McQuillin
author: Robert Sugden
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-07-12T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: Accepted manuscript.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6902153
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: balanced contributions
zbMATH Keywords: merge-externalities
zbMATH Keywords: semivalues
zbMATH Keywords: coalitional bargaining
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2794724046
cites work: Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
cites work: On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games
cites work: Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value
cites work: Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt
cites work: Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
cites work: On merge properties of the Shapley value
cites work: On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
cites work: Value Theory Without Efficiency
cites work: Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
cites work: Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
cites work: Collusion properties of values
cites work: Potential, Value, and Consistency
cites work: Bargaining and Value
cites work: An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
cites work: Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
cites work: The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure
cites work: Backward Induction Foundations of the Shapley Value
cites work: Graphs and Cooperation in Games
cites work: Conference structures and fair allocation rules
cites work: On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom
cites work: Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
cites work: THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
cites work: Balanced contributions axiom in the solution of cooperative games
cites work: The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
cites work: Q5817870
cites work: The assignment game. I: The core
cites work: N‐person games in partition function form
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.03.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6902153