Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91036
author: Geoffroy de Clippel
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-07-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6902156
zbMATH Keywords: cooperative games
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: axioms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.09.004
OpenAlex ID: W2755754272
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.09.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6902156