Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91376
author: Ravi Jagadeesan
author: Scott Duke Kominers
author: Ross Rheingans-Yoo
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-07-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6902170
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: lone wolf theorem
zbMATH Keywords: rural hospitals theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2018.01.010
OpenAlex ID: W2752501303
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.01.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6902170