Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91380
author: Alex Rees-Jones
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-07-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6902172
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance algorithm
zbMATH Keywords: suboptimal behavior
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.04.011
OpenAlex ID: W3124204936
cites work: Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
cites work: Strategy-proofness in the Large
cites work: Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
cites work: School choice: an experimental study
cites work: Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
cites work: Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
cites work: Marriage, honesty, and stability
cites work: The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
cites work: School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
cites work: Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.011
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6902172