The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1400.91019
author: Jane Friedman
author: Cameron Parker
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-07-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6902176
zbMATH Keywords: cooperative games
zbMATH Keywords: ternary voting games
zbMATH Keywords: ordinal equivalence
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley-Shubik index
zbMATH Keywords: postulates of power measures
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2018.03.014
OpenAlex ID: W2795835285
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.03.014
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6902176