A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
zbMATH Open document ID: 1401.91025
author: Maria Montero
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form. We show that agreement is immediate in equilibrium, and the proposer advantage disappears as the breakdown probability goes to zero. We then turn to the special case of apex games and explore the consequences of varying the probabilities that govern the selection of formateurs and proposers. Letting the breakdown probability go to zero, most of the probabilities considered lead to the same ex post pay-off division. Ex ante expected pay-offs may follow a counterintuitive pattern: as the bargaining power of weak players within a protocoalition increases, the weak players may expect a lower pay-off ex ante.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6900966
zbMATH Keywords: coalition formation
zbMATH Keywords: legislative bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: apex games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g6020039
OpenAlex ID: W2034759273
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DOI: 10.3390/G6020039
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6900966