What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91027
author: Ethan Akin
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: For the iterated prisoner's dilemma there exist good strategies which solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long term average payoff. When used by both players, these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them. Neither player can benefit by moving unilaterally to any other strategy, i.e., these provide Nash equilibria. In addition, if a player uses instead an alternative which decreases the opponent's payoff below the cooperative level, then his own payoff is decreased as well. Thus, if we limit attention to the long term payoff, these strategies effectively stabilize cooperative behavior. The existence of such strategies follows from the so-called folk theorem for supergames, and the proof constructs an explicit memory-one example, which has been labeled Grim. Here we describe all the memory-one good strategies for the non-symmetric version of the prisoner's dilemma. This is the natural object of study when the payoffs are in units of the separate players' utilities. We discuss the special advantages and problems associated with some specific good strategies.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60J20
zbMATH DE Number: 6900972
zbMATH Keywords: prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: stable cooperative behavior
zbMATH Keywords: iterated play
zbMATH Keywords: Markov strategies
zbMATH Keywords: good strategies
zbMATH Keywords: individual utility
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g6030175
OpenAlex ID: W1954288387
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DOI: 10.3390/G6030175
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6900972