Fairness and trust in structured populations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Fairness and trust in structured populations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91063
author: Corina E. Tarnita
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: Classical economic theory assumes that people are rational and selfish, but behavioral experiments often point to inconsistent behavior, typically attributed to ``other regarding preferences''. The ultimatum game, used to study fairness, and the trust game, used to study trust and trustworthiness, have been two of the most influential and well-studied examples of inconsistent behavior. Recently, evolutionary biologists have attempted to explain the evolution of such preferences using evolutionary game theoretic models. While deterministic evolutionary game theoretic models agree with the classical economics predictions, recent stochastic approaches that include uncertainty and the possibility of mistakes have been successful in accounting for both the evolution of fairness and the evolution of trust. Here I explore the role of population structure by generalizing and expanding these existing results to the case of non-random interactions. This is a natural extension since such interactions do not occur randomly in the daily lives of individuals. I find that, in the limit of weak selection, population structure increases the space of fair strategies that are selected for but it has little-to-no effect on the optimum strategy played in the ultimatum game. In the trust game, in the limit of weak selection, I find that some amount of trust and trustworthiness can evolve even in a well-mixed population; however, the optimal strategy, although trusting if the return on investment is sufficiently high, is never trustworthy. Population structure biases selection towards strategies that are both trusting and trustworthy trustworthy and reduces the critical return threshold, but, much like in the case of fairness, it does not affect the winning strategy. Further considering the effects of reputation and structure, I find that they act synergistically to promote the evolution of trustworthiness.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 6900974
zbMATH Keywords: ultimatum game
zbMATH Keywords: trust game
zbMATH Keywords: reputation
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Keywords: population structure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g6030214
OpenAlex ID: W2162470231
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DOI: 10.3390/G6030214
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6900974