The evolvability of cooperation under local and non-local mutations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The evolvability of cooperation under local and non-local mutations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91062
author: Alexander J. Stewart
author: Joshua B. Plotkin
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interactions, encoded as iterated games. We consider evolution within the space of memory-1 strategies, and we characterize all evolutionary robust outcomes, as well as their tendency to evolve under the evolutionary dynamics of the system. When mutations are restricted to be local, as opposed to non-local, then a wider range of evolutionary robust outcomes tend to emerge, but mutual cooperation is more difficult to evolve. When we further allow heritable mutations to the player's investment level in each cooperative interaction, then co-evolution leads to changes in the payoff structure of the game itself and to specific pairings of robust games and strategies in the population. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of the genetic architectures that encode how an individual expresses its strategy or investment.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6900975
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: evolvability
zbMATH Keywords: adaptive dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: iterated games
zbMATH Keywords: memory-1 strategies
zbMATH Keywords: payoff evolution
zbMATH Keywords: evolution of investment
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g6030231
OpenAlex ID: W1490459657
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DOI: 10.3390/G6030231
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6900975