Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1403.91088
author: Juan Camilo Cárdenas
author: César Mantilla
author: Rajiv Sethi
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
zbMATH DE Number: 6900979
zbMATH Keywords: common pool resource games
zbMATH Keywords: experiments
zbMATH Keywords: sampling equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: quantal response equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g6030299
OpenAlex ID: W3124970167
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DOI: 10.3390/G6030299
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6900979