Salience and strategy choice in \(2\times 2\) games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Salience and strategy choice in \(2\times 2\) games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1401.91014
author: Jonathan W. Leland
author: Mark Schneider
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot \(2\times 2\) games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent's payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model's predictions correspond to those of level-1 players in a cognitive hierarchy model. When it is the other player's payoffs that are salient, the predictions of the model correspond to those of traditional game theory. The model provides unique predictions for the entire class of \(2\times 2\) games. It identifies games where a Nash equilibrium will always occur, ones where it will never occur, and ones where it will occur only for certain payoff values. It also predicts the outcome of games for which there are no pure Nash equilibria. Experimental results supporting these predictions are presented.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6900990
zbMATH Keywords: behavioral game theory
zbMATH Keywords: bounded rationality
zbMATH Keywords: salience
zbMATH Keywords: heuristics
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g6040521
OpenAlex ID: W2126177471
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DOI: 10.3390/G6040521
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6900990