Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91059
author: Tatsuya Sasaki
author: Isamu Okada
author: Satoshi Uchida
author: Xiaojie Chen
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and pool punishment for sanctioning free riders separately. However, these sanctioning mechanisms often pose a puzzling tradeoff between efficiency and stability in detecting and punishing free riders. Here, we combine the key aspects of these qualitatively different mechanisms in terms of evolutionary game theory. Based on the dilemmatic donation game, we introduce a strategy of commitment to both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make a certain deposit. The deposit will be refunded as long as the committers faithfully cooperate in the donation game and punish free riders and non-committers. It turns out that the deposit-based commitment offers both the efficiency of peer punishment and the stability of pool punishment and that the replicator dynamics lead to transitions of different systems: pool punishment to commitment to peer punishment.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6900992
zbMATH Keywords: evolution of cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: peer punishment
zbMATH Keywords: pool punishment
zbMATH Keywords: commitment
zbMATH Keywords: refundable deposit
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g6040574
OpenAlex ID: W1926119587
cites work: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
cites work: The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
cites work: The Calculus of Selfishness
cites work: Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
cites work: Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
cites work: Q4717892
DOI: 10.3390/G6040574
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6900992