The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: some experimental evidence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: some experimental evidence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1403.91089
author: Ananish Chaudhuri
author: Tirnud Paichayontvijit
author: Erwann Sbai
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by \textit{L. Cameron} et al. [``Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore'', J. Pub. Econ. 93, No. 7--8, 843--851 (2009; \url{doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.03.004})] to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a corrupt transaction, over and above any sentiments of inequity aversion or negative reciprocity However, showing subjects the history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6901009
zbMATH Keywords: corruption
zbMATH Keywords: experiments
zbMATH Keywords: bribes
zbMATH Keywords: punishment
zbMATH Keywords: framing
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g7020013
OpenAlex ID: W2471213140
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DOI: 10.3390/G7020013
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6901009