The effects of excluding coalitions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The effects of excluding coalitions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1401.91023
author: Tobias Hiller
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value (\(\varphi^E\) value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6901011
zbMATH Keywords: excluded coalitions
zbMATH Keywords: quarreling
zbMATH Keywords: \(\varphi^E\) value
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: cooperative game theory
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g9010001
OpenAlex ID: W2781823667
cites work: Q5817870
cites work: Graphs and Cooperation in Games
cites work: Cooperation when some players are incompatible
cites work: Spectrum value for coalitional games
cites work: Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
cites work: Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
cites work: Axioms for Shapley values in games with quarrelling
cites work: Conference structures and fair allocation rules
cites work: Q5844986
cites work: Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
cites work: Cooperative games with coalition structures
cites work: Q4178815
cites work: On weighted Shapley values
cites work: A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
cites work: On the Position Value for Communication Situations
cites work: Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
cites work: Axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value for games with permission structures
cites work: An axiomatization of the disjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure
cites work: Link formation in cooperative situations.
cites work: SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
DOI: 10.3390/G9010001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6901011