Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: bigger is not necessarily better
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: bigger is not necessarily better
zbMATH Open document ID: 1403.91093
author: Briony D. Pulford
author: Andrew M. Colman
author: Graham Loomes
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices in eight \(3\times 3\) and four \(4\times 4\) normal-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost indistinguishable between the two conditions. These results are in line with earlier findings on individual decision making and with a parametric model, in which the incentive elasticity of effort is very small when compared with other factors, such as the complexity of the decision problem.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6901014
zbMATH Keywords: capital-labor-production framework
zbMATH Keywords: crowding out
zbMATH Keywords: experimental games
zbMATH Keywords: incentives
zbMATH Keywords: incentive elasticity of effort
zbMATH Keywords: reasons for choices
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g9010004
OpenAlex ID: W2785151391
cites work: Some experimental games
cites work: The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. (With commentaries)
cites work: Comparing attitudes toward time and toward money in experience-based decisions
cites work: Higher Order Risk Attitudes, Demographics, and Financial Decisions
cites work: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
cites work: Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?
cites work: A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
cites work: The effect of the background risk in a simple chance improving decision model
cites work: On the validity of the random lottery incentive system
cites work: Emotion at stake -- the role of stake size and emotions in a power-to-take game experiment in China with a comparison to Europe
cites work: Stochastic choice and the allocation of cognitive effort
cites work: Does repetition improve consistency?
DOI: 10.3390/G9010004
Recommended article: Incentive-compatibility in large games
Recommended article: The impact of incentives upon risky choice experiments
Recommended article: Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games
Recommended article: Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis
Recommended article: The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
Recommended article: Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence
Recommended article: The effect of stakes in distribution experiments
Recommended article: Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6901014