Intention-based sharing
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Intention-based sharing
zbMATH Open document ID: 1404.91149
author: Daniela Di Cagno
author: Arianna Galliera
author: Luca Panaccione
author: Werner Güth
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other's intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6901032
zbMATH Keywords: (conditional) generosity
zbMATH Keywords: ultimatum game
zbMATH Keywords: yes-no game
zbMATH Keywords: impunity game
zbMATH Keywords: experiments
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
describes a project that uses: ORSEE
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g9020022
OpenAlex ID: W2801241310
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DOI: 10.3390/G9020022
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6901032