Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1404.91083
author: Alexander Mayer
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-07-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as ``null players''. Luxembourg's role in the council of ministers during the first period of the European economic community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper contrasts the textbook claim that Luxembourg was a null player with a more comprehensive picture of Luxembourg's role in EEC's voting system. The assessment of Luxembourg's voting power is sensitive to the role played by the European commission in the decision-making procedure and the measurement concepts underlying power evaluations.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6901039
zbMATH Keywords: weighted voting
zbMATH Keywords: simple games
zbMATH Keywords: voting power
zbMATH Keywords: null player
zbMATH Keywords: dummy player
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g9020029
OpenAlex ID: W2803826101
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Wikidata QID: Q129805211
DOI: 10.3390/G9020029
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6901039