Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91271
author: Francisco Candel-Sánchez
author: Juan Perote-Peña
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2018-07-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6904334
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: lobby formation
zbMATH Keywords: signaling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00712-017-0547-3
OpenAlex ID: W2613652067
cites work: Common Agency
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
cites work: Sequential Equilibria
DOI: 10.1007/S00712-017-0547-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6904334