Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
zbMATH Open document ID: 1408.91087
author: Raffaele Fiocco
author: Mario Gilli
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2018-08-07T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 466.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6914317
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: auditing
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
zbMATH Keywords: regulation
Wikidata QID: Q57998462
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1952926738
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cites work: Q4004282
cites work: Delay in bargaining games with complete information
cites work: Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
DOI: 10.1007/S00712-015-0456-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6914317