Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks
zbMATH Open document ID: 1408.91141
author: Michela Cella
author: Federico Etro
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2018-08-07T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: mibwpaper328.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6914370
zbMATH Keywords: oligopoly
zbMATH Keywords: screening
zbMATH Keywords: two way distortion
zbMATH Keywords: incentives
zbMATH Keywords: investments
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2400847365
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cites work: Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
DOI: 10.1007/S00712-016-0472-X
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6914370