Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 1392.90116
author: Dávid Csercsik
author: László Á. Kóczy
published in: Networks and Spatial Economics
publication date: 2018-08-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C35
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6914930
zbMATH Keywords: partition function form games
zbMATH Keywords: power transmission networks
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: recursive core
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11067-017-9363-0
OpenAlex ID: W3123209425
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DOI: 10.1007/S11067-017-9363-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6914930