Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty
zbMATH Open document ID: 1410.91135
author: Lina Mallozzi
author: Roberta Messalli
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-08-13T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: We study a noncooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payoffs depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the followers, act non-cooperatively between themselves and solve a Nash equilibrium problem. We assume an exogenous uncertainty affecting the aggregator and we obtain existence results for the stochastic resulting game. Some examples are illustrated.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
zbMATH DE Number: 6916600
zbMATH Keywords: aggregative game
zbMATH Keywords: hierarchical model
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g8030025
OpenAlex ID: W2661542186
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DOI: 10.3390/G8030025
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6916600