The impact of previous action on bargaining -- an experiment on the emergence of preferences for fairness norms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The impact of previous action on bargaining -- an experiment on the emergence of preferences for fairness norms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1410.91250
author: Thomas Neumann
author: Stephan Schosser
author: Bodo Vogt
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-08-13T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: The communication of participants to identify an acceptable bargaining outcome in the Nash bargaining game is all about fairness norms. Participants introduce fairness norms which yield a better outcome for themselves in order to convince the other participant of their bargaining proposal. Typically, these fairness norms are in line with theoretical predictions, which support a wide variety of different but fair outcomes the participants can choose from. In this experiment, we play two treatments of the Nash bargaining game: in one treatment, the participants play a dictator game prior to bargaining, and in the other treatment they do not. We find that participants who have not played the dictator game intensively discuss the outcome of the game and come to solutions closer to the equal split of the pie the longer they chat. This effect vanishes as soon as the participants have previous experience from a dictator game: instead of chatting, they establish the fairness norm introduced in the dictator game. Remarkably, if the dictator is unfair in the dictator game, he also gets a higher share of the pie in the Nash bargaining game.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6916609
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining game
zbMATH Keywords: dictator game
zbMATH Keywords: norms
zbMATH Keywords: experimental economics
describes a project that uses: hroot
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g8030034
OpenAlex ID: W2749902383
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
cites work: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
cites work: A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
cites work: Trust, reciprocity, and social history
DOI: 10.3390/G8030034
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6916609