Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists
zbMATH Open document ID: 1410.91057
author: Ingela Alger
author: Jörgen W. Weibull
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-08-13T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not only care about their own material payoffs but also about those to others, and, by a moralist, we mean someone who cares about own material payoff and also about what would be his or her material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard public goods games. In infinitely repeated games, however, both altruism and morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient equilibria while altruism cannot.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6916613
zbMATH Keywords: altruism
zbMATH Keywords: morality
zbMATH Keywords: homo moralis
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: coordination games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
Wikidata QID: Q115783313
full work available at URL: g8030038
OpenAlex ID: W2754201343
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DOI: 10.3390/G8030038
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6916613