Shapley value-based payment calculation for energy exchange between micro- and utility grids
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Shapley value-based payment calculation for energy exchange between micro- and utility grids
zbMATH Open document ID: 1410.91363
author: Robin Pilling
author: Shi Chung Chang
author: Peter B. Luh
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-08-13T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: In recent years, microgrids have developed as important parts of power systems and have provided affordable, reliable, and sustainable supplies of electricity. Each microgrid is managed as a single controllable entity with respect to the existing power system but demands for joint operation and sharing the benefits between a microgrid and its hosting utility. This paper is focused on the joint operation of a microgrid and its hosting utility, which cooperatively minimize daily generation costs through energy exchange, and presents a payment calculation scheme for power transactions based on a fair allocation of reduced generation costs. To fairly compensate for energy exchange between the micro- and utility grids, we adopt the cooperative game theoretic solution concept of Shapley value. We design a case study for a fictitious interconnection model between the Mueller microgrid in Austin, Texas and the utility grid in Taiwan. Our case study shows that when compared to standalone generations, both the micro- and utility grids are better off when they collaborate in power exchange regardless of their individual contributions to the power exchange coalition.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B74
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6916620
zbMATH Keywords: energy exchange
zbMATH Keywords: cooperative game theory
zbMATH Keywords: microgrid economics
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g8040045
OpenAlex ID: W2767202227
cites work: Q3524724
cites work: Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
cites work: Q5817870
cites work: Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games
DOI: 10.3390/G8040045
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6916620