Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1410.91060
author: Kimmo Berg
author: G. Schoenmakers
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-08-13T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of equilibrium payoffs. These sets are called self-supporting sets, since the set itself provides the continuation payoffs that are required to support the equilibrium strategies. Moreover, the corresponding strategies are simple as the players face the same augmented game on each round but they play different mixed actions after each realized pure-action profile. We find that certain payoffs can be obtained in equilibrium with much lower discount factor values compared to pure strategies. The theory and the concepts are illustrated in \(2\times 2\) games.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6916622
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: mixed strategy
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfection
zbMATH Keywords: payoff set
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g8040047
OpenAlex ID: W2766452142
cites work: Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
cites work: Strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and discounting
cites work: Algorithms for finding repeated game equilibria
cites work: Computing Supergame Equilibria
cites work: An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
cites work: FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES
cites work: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
cites work: On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
cites work: The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
cites work: Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions
cites work: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
cites work: Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
cites work: Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
cites work: Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
cites work: A folk theorem for stochastic games
cites work: Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
cites work: Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
cites work: Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames
cites work: A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
cites work: Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
cites work: Restricted feedback in long term relationships
cites work: On Repeated Games with Complete Information
cites work: The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
cites work: The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
cites work: A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory
cites work: Q3407085
cites work: Q3773727
cites work: On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
cites work: The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
DOI: 10.3390/G8040047
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6916622