Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders
zbMATH Open document ID: 1401.91592
author: Michi Nishihara
author: Takashi Shibata
publication date: 2018-08-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/62185
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91G80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6916918
zbMATH Keywords: bankruptcy
zbMATH Keywords: adverse selection
zbMATH Keywords: accounting quality
zbMATH Keywords: signaling game
zbMATH Keywords: real options
zbMATH Keywords: M\&A
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2734445089
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JEDC.2018.02.006
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6916918