The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
zbMATH Open document ID: 1506.91049
author: Daniel Binkele-Raible
author: Gábor Erdélyi
author: Henning Fernau
author: J. Goldsmith
author: Nicholas Mattei
author: Jörg Rothe
published in: Discrete Optimization
publication date: 2018-08-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q17
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6920193
zbMATH Keywords: computational complexity
zbMATH Keywords: parameterized complexity
zbMATH Keywords: approximability
zbMATH Keywords: computational social choice
describes a project that uses: Paramils
describes a project that uses: SATzilla
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.disopt.2013.10.003
OpenAlex ID: W2569303878
Wikidata QID: Q59864911
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DBLP publication ID: journals/disopt/Binkele-RaibleEFGMR14
DOI: 10.1016/J.DISOPT.2013.10.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6920193