Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1410.91046
author: Julio B. Clempner
author: Alexander S. Poznyak
published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation
publication date: 2018-08-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6925051
zbMATH Keywords: strong Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Markov chains
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.amc.2015.06.005
OpenAlex ID: W823755433
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DOI: 10.1016/J.AMC.2015.06.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6925051