Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91135
author: Matías Núñez
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-08-31T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6929883
zbMATH Keywords: approval voting
zbMATH Keywords: strategy proofness
zbMATH Keywords: cardinal utilities
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2015.10.003
OpenAlex ID: W2177772880
cites work: Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
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cites work: Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
cites work: Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
cites work: The Basic Approval Voting Game
cites work: Bargaining through approval
cites work: Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.10.003
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6929883