Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91237
author: Jürgen Eichberger
author: Dmitri Vinogradov
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-03T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1-s2.0-S0165176516300337-main.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6930277
zbMATH Keywords: unmatched bid auction
zbMATH Keywords: selling mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2286795403
cites work: Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.02.012
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6930277