Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91228
author: Brian Baisa
author: Stanislav Rabinovich
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6930292
zbMATH Keywords: optimal auction
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay auction
zbMATH Keywords: budget constraints
zbMATH Keywords: liquidity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2016.02.017
OpenAlex ID: W2290756805
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.02.017
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6930292