Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91269
author: Alexander Matros
author: Alex Possajennikov
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-03T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: FinalAccepted EconLett Mar16.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6930312
zbMATH Keywords: common value
zbMATH Keywords: contests
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2295199316
cites work: Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
cites work: Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
cites work: Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
cites work: Common-value auctions with discrete private information
cites work: Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.03.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6930312