Does regret matter in first-price auctions?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Does regret matter in first-price auctions?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91277
author: Anmol Ratan
author: Yuanji Wen
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6930633
zbMATH Keywords: overbidding
zbMATH Keywords: auction
zbMATH Keywords: anticipated regret
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity
zbMATH Keywords: laboratory experiments
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2016.03.021
OpenAlex ID: W2339530877
cites work: Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
cites work: Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
cites work: Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
cites work: Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
cites work: Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
cites work: Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?
cites work: Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
cites work: Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.03.021
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6930633