How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91125
author: Peng Zhang
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-08-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6928543
zbMATH Keywords: strategic voting
zbMATH Keywords: large Poisson games
zbMATH Keywords: public information
zbMATH Keywords: partisan voters
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2016.10.041
OpenAlex ID: W2548471677
cites work: Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
cites work: On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
cites work: Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
cites work: Large Poisson games
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.10.041
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6928543