Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1416.91105
author: Ville Korpela
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2018-08-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6929223
zbMATH Keywords: characterization
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: ex ante fairness
zbMATH Keywords: ex post fairness
zbMATH Keywords: symmetry
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2018.06.001
OpenAlex ID: W2808862694
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Wikidata QID: Q129650747
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.06.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6929223