Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1405.91041
author: Jorge Peña
author: Enea Pestelacci
author: André Berchtold
author: Marco Tomassini
published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology
publication date: 2018-09-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6932437
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Keywords: evolution of cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: upstream reciprocity
zbMATH Keywords: non-uniform interaction rates
zbMATH Keywords: participation costs
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jtbi.2010.12.043
OpenAlex ID: W1994836788
Wikidata QID: Q47329578
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2010.12.043
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6932437