The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91240
author: Xin Feng
author: Jingfeng Lu
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6934520
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: contests
zbMATH Keywords: information disclosure
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic entry
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2016.08.038
OpenAlex ID: W2507853202
cites work: Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
cites work: Contests with a stochastic number of players
cites work: Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.08.038
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6934520