Incompatibility between stability and consistency
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incompatibility between stability and consistency
zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91556
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2018-09-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6934704
zbMATH Keywords: matching theory
zbMATH Keywords: market design
zbMATH Keywords: consistency
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: incompatibility
zbMATH Keywords: school choice
author: Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan
author: Umut Mert Dur
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2016.11.022
OpenAlex ID: W2550873507
Wikidata QID: Q57428950
cites work: The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
cites work: When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
cites work: Consistency in house allocation problems
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: School Choice with Consent*
cites work: Local and global consistency properties for student placement
cites work: Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
cites work: The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
cites work: Multilateral Bargaining
cites work: A market to implement the core
cites work: House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
cites work: Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.11.022
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6934704