Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1375.91096
author: Seungjin Han
publication date: 2017-10-26T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 2014-05.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6798652
zbMATH Keywords: implicit collusion
zbMATH Keywords: competing mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: online markets
zbMATH Keywords: clickstream
zbMATH Keywords: robust equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1509914498
cites work: A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
cites work: Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
cites work: Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
cites work: Robust competitive auctions
cites work: Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
cites work: A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
cites work: A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
cites work: Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2015-0106
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6798652