On the possibility of price wars when firms use a `tit-for-tat' strategy
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the possibility of price wars when firms use a `tit-for-tat' strategy
zbMATH Open document ID: 1375.91113
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(90)90062-6
author: Paul W. Dobson
author: C. Donald Sinclair
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2017-11-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 6804907
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(90)90062-6
OpenAlex ID: W1999787867
cites work: The Evolution of Cooperation
cites work: Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
cites work: Q3993525
cites work: Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
cites work: Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6804907