Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
zbMATH Open document ID: 1415.91060
author: Bauke Visser
author: Vladimir A. Karamychev
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2017-11-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6805863
zbMATH Keywords: cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: money burning
zbMATH Keywords: persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: optimal equilibrium
Wikidata QID: Q59514937
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-016-0558-2
OpenAlex ID: W2552182715
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DBLP publication ID: journals/ijgt/KaramychevV17
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-016-0558-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6805863