Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
zbMATH Open document ID: 1415.91211
author: Azar Abizada
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2017-11-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6805865
zbMATH Keywords: pairwise stability
zbMATH Keywords: budget constraint
zbMATH Keywords: path to stability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-016-0564-4
OpenAlex ID: W2528406312
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-016-0564-4
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6805865