Scheduling without payments
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Scheduling without payments
zbMATH Open document ID: 1380.90120
author: Elias Koutsoupias
published in: Theory of Computing Systems
publication date: 2017-11-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B35
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 6803511
zbMATH Keywords: algorithmic game theory
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00224-013-9473-0
OpenAlex ID: W2172987439
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DOI: 10.1007/S00224-013-9473-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6803511